In 1953, almost fifty years prior to the attacks of September 11th, the United States government executed an intensively planned but secret operation aiming to return the pro-Western Shah of Iran to his throne. Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle Eastern Terror tells the largely unknown story of a historic CIA-backed coup, which forced popular Iranian political leader Mohammad Mossadegh from office. The book was published in 2003, when fundamentalist Islam was still relatively new to the public eye, and Kinzer attempts to provide rational explanations for seemingly irrational ideologies stemming from the Middle East. The author draws a direct line between the actions of the CIA in 1953 and the rise of radical Islam. All the Shah’s Men is full of Kinzer’s own findings in Iran, official CIA records and memoirs, and direct quotes from British and American government officials. Kinzer’s research focuses heavily on Iranian history and Shiite Islamic values in relation to politics. The British government, the CIA, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Industry, as well as two contrasting American presidents in Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower are also the subject of the book’s analysis. Mohammed Mossadegh is presented as the charismatic protagonist of Iranian history, a nationalist who falls victim to the impulsive and irresponsible actions of more powerful governments. Stephen Kinzer proves he has a broad understanding of Iranian history and also a daft knowledge of Iranian culture. He is qualified in his take on the CIA’s actions and uses the events of the 21st century to justify his connection between the coup and the current rift between the Middle East and the West. This paper will analyse whether such connections are valid and whether Kinzer’s perception of Mossadegh is accurate. While in power, Mossadegh was both hailed and criticized. The New York Times compared the Iranian prime minister to Thomas Jefferson while the British media called him a “tragic Frankenstein”.1 Kinzer endorses him as a hero. Whether the ideas and linkage of historic events presented in the novel are justified is up for interpretation; however this paper will reach a conclusion as to whether they are in fact accurate and worth recognizing in historical context.
All the Shah’s Men presents the American led coup in 1953 as the beginning of all fundamental problems pertaining to the Muslim Middle East and its relations with the western world. The impact that the coup had on Iran and its neighbours is profound according to Kinzer, as he argues that the overthrow of Mossadegh in favour of the oppressive Shah prevented Iran from becoming a democratic nation.2 If America had remained neutral in Iran, perhaps a democratic Iran would be a valuable ally of the United States, therefore changing the face of Middle Eastern history completely. However, the United States did not remain neutral and willingly placed Iran under the rule of authoritarian monarch Mohammad Reza Shah. Kinzer claims that the Shah’s long rule over Iran coupled with general resentment towards America among the Iranian people sparked the rise of radical Islamic politics. The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought Islamic revolutionaries to power all the while preaching anti-western ideals that have carried through to the present day. Kinzer’s work details the history of Iran from its religious and cultural foundations to the overthrow of nationalist Mohammed Mossadegh. He examines the internal operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its impact on Iran’s economic prosperity. The careers of the Dulles brothers are explored as they head the newly founded CIA and play key roles in all stages of the coup. He delves into Mossadegh’s personality in relation to his politics and eventual downfall. Furthermore, Kinzer contrasts the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower and their handling of relations with Iran and Britain. The book includes some excellent research by the author as he quotes insightful CIA records and travels to Iran seeking out evidence of Mossadegh’s legacy. Essentially, Kinzer not only tells the story of the coup itself, but the more historically significant story behind it.
Over two-hundred years before Mohammad Mossadegh came to power, the Qajar dynasty ruled Iran. Horrific leaders, specifically in regards to the managing the economy, the dynasty emptied out the country’s treasury and were financially desperate. To save what was left of the Iranian economy, the Qajars granted the British a tobacco concession. This essentially meant that the British had bought itself power over Iranian natural resources. Britain’s power became absolute when English millionaire William Knox D’Arcy was granted exclusive rights to search, find, and sell natural gas. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company developed from D’Arcy’s findings ten years after. The company’s practices could best be described as colonial. The AIOC allowed only British workers to obtain leadership positions within the company and provided deplorable working conditions for its Iranian workers. The AIOC made obscene profits off of Iranian workers extracting Iran’s natural resources, and this was the core issue that would fuel Mossadegh’s passionate rise to power.
In April of 1951, Mohammad Mossadegh was elected Prime Minister of Iran after expressing his desire to nationalize the oil industry and free Iran from British control. The foreseeable battle ensued immediately as Mossadegh would settle for nothing less than nationalization, and Britain refused to compromise any of its power. President Harry Truman was in office at the time of Mossadegh`s election, and sympathized with nationalist movements like Iran`s. He did not believe in the colonial system being imposed by the AIOC, and tried to act as a mediator to resolve the dispute quietly. Despite Truman’s efforts, neither Iran nor Britain could come to an agreement. Hardliner Winston Churchill was re-elected in 1951, and when Dwight Eisenhower was elected in the United States, Churchill finally found support from the White House. He wisely caught Eisenhower`s attention by claiming Iran could fall to communism unless Mossadegh was overthrown. Although the President was receptive to the idea of a coup, he was detached from Operation Ajax to a great extent. In regards to planning and logistics, all facets of the operation were overseen by the Dulles brothers of the CIA The brothers were given free reign by the administration and worked in close cooperation with the British before and during the coup. The CIA agent heading up the operation in Iran was Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. It was his sheer determination that allowed Operation Ajax to succeed against all odds.
As part of Operation Ajax, Roosevelt and his contacts within Iran managed to cause great turmoil in the country. Kinzer writes, “Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents . . . had pushed Iran to the brink of Chaos.”11 While CIA agents waited listening to their favourite show tune, “Luck be a Lady Tonight” which had a lyrical resonance to the coup, newspapers and religious leaders were “screaming for Mossadegh’s head”. Protests and riots organized by the CIA had turned the streets into battlegrounds.” Despite this, the first attempt at overthrowing Mossadegh failed. Roosevelt was being urged to flee by his superiors in Washington, but he refused. Instead, he decided to try again. His new plan included bribing politicians and mullahs across Iran who were capable of forming crowds. And as even more chaos ensued on the streets of Iran due to the CIA’s bribes, Roosevelt used military and police units to storm government buildings and capture Mossadegh. The second attempt was successful and Mossadegh was taken into custody. Roosevelt was so effective in fact, that he brilliantly circulated a false version of the first coup claiming that Mossadegh tried to oust the Shah from his throne. Very few Iranians even knew that Mossadegh was the intended target of the first attempt.
After the coup, the Shah returned to power, the AIOC was reformed, and Iran’s path towards democracy was reversed. The Shah gradually turned tyrannical and ran the country through fear and oppression. A member of British Parliament described his rule of Iran as such. He stated, “Reza Shah eliminated all the thieves and bandits in Iran and he made his countrymen realize there would be only one thief in Iran.” Opposition to the Shah’s tyranny was inevitable. When the opposition finally formed, it was powered by religious-based politics. Islamic fundamentalists such as Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the revolution, shared Mossadegh’s desire for independence and the removal or foreign influence. However, what was deemed to be appropriate means by which to achieve independence varied drastically.
For the first time in history, the United States had become the enemy of Iran, even more so than Britain, as their role in the coup grew to be common knowledge. Kinzer makes it clear that America cannot expect to have any credibility in bringing democracy to Iran fifty years after it destroyed the country’s best chance at becoming a thriving democracy.
Middle Eastern history is filled with cultural and political revolutions, many of which have impacted other parts of the world as well. Mohammed Mossadegh’s rise to power and his subsequent overthrow at the hands of the CIA is often forgotten but lies at the heart of many issues facing the Middle East today. Stephen Kinzer has re-told the remarkable story of the 1953 coup in All the Shah’s Men, and argues it to be much more historically important than ever thought before. He implicates Britain and the arrogance of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as well as President Eisenhower and the CIA as culprits in planning and executing the coup. Kinzer systematically goes through each party individually, states their crimes, and proves them to be guilty through the use of his own research. Recently released CIA records of the coup also help to place the actions of all involved in a very negative light. Remarkably, the author is able to justify nearly all his accusations and provides more than ample evidence to support his arguments. The author’s conviction only falters at the end, where Kinzer takes a giant leap through history, uncharacteristically neglecting historic events, just as so many have neglected the 1953 coup in Iran.
One of the book’s most convincing arguments states that after the successful overthrow of Mossadegh, the United States became attracted to the business of regime-change. Once Operation Ajax was over and Iran was back in the hands of the Shah, America confidently participated in multiple coups across the world in Chile, Guatemala, and Vietnam. More recently of course, although not explicitly mentioned by Kinzer, Afghanistan and Iraq, which are consistent with the now age old notion of American intervention. As stated in the book’s preface, it seems everything has come full circle, as now again the United States and its allies are discussing methods of intervention in Iran. It is cruelly ironic that intervention may be deemed necessary, arguably due to the aftermath of a prior intervention. Kinzer supports his argument effectively and proves that American intervention has had negative repercussions, specifically in Iran. On a global scale, Kinzer recognizes the need for all governments to use foresight while planning any type of action, be it covert, overt, diplomatic, or otherwise.
Although there were aspects of the CIA backing of the coup that Kinzer did not give appropriate attention. For instance, a point within the book that was not sufficiently covered was the communist Tudeh party, which had close relations with the neighbouring Soviet Union. A huge factor to the American support of intervention was the communist threat that the Soviet Union posed to Iran. This threat was in reality undeniable but was understated in the novel. The Tudeh party in Iran was active and received information and weaponry directly from Moscow. America had ample basis for concern over the spread of communism in Iran, and could not risk losing an oil-rich nation to the Soviet Union. Kinzer, much like Mossadegh, overlooks the seriousness of the communist threat which was a main reason behind Eisenhower agreeing to the coup in the first place. Had Iran’s attempt at nationalism come at a different period in history, the cold war would not have been a factor in America’s decision making. But that was not the case, and the CIA’s backing of the coup has to be looked at in proper context.
The smaller arguments or points within the book all eventually tie into Kinzer’s main focus, which is his attempt at connecting the coup of 1953 with the roots of modern terrorism. He writes, “It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.” This serves as his thesis, the main point he is trying to prove through all of his arguments. Kinzer succeeds at least partially in proving his thesis to be justified. After reading the book and looking at the facts Kinzer has presented, it is understood that a line can be drawn from Operation Ajax to the Shah’s repressive regime, to the Iranian revolution. However that line cannot be further connected to the attacks on the World Trade Center or to the roots of Middle Eastern terror as the subtitle suggests. It is possible that a connection exists, but based on the evidence provided by Kinzer, the reader has no way of making this conclusion but almost has to take the author’s word for it. It is true that America disrupted the natural emergence of democracy in Iran and it is also true that America indirectly encouraged support for fundamentalist Islamic leaders. However, to claim that terrorism stemming from the Middle East is due to the coup is taking quite a leap through history and frankly lets far too many other guilty parties off the hook. The United States and Britain knew that the Shah was not the most competent leader but had no way of foreseeing the ruthless dictator he evolved into. Also, there is a difference between religious based politics and religious extremism. The methods which future leaders of Iran utilized while in power were not the fault of any party other than the Islamic leaders themselves and the Iranians that supported them.
It is more than fair to suggest that due to the Iranian revolution, radical Shiite Muslims in Iran inspired Sunni and Shiite Muslims elsewhere to challenge for power. Despite this, the revolution cannot be blamed for the creation of modern extremism or the pure criminal acts of the Taliban, Bin Laden and similar organizations. To discredit Kinzer’s theory some very simply questions must be asked. Would Bin Laden and the Taliban still exist had the United States not intervened in Iran? Would the Middle East be democratic for the most part, with fair elections for all citizens if not for the coup of 1953? And most importantly, would American intervention in the name of self interest been inevitable at some point, even if not in 1953? A clear answer to these questions does not exist in the text and therefore Kinzer is unable to sell the reader on his entire thesis. It should be noted that all modern terrorist groups feed off of personal hatred stemming from a wide range of sources, whether it is the Israeli occupation of Palestine, American foreign intervention or some form of childhood misfortune. Terrorism in the Middle East would have almost certainly manifested itself with or without the CIA removing Mossadegh from power.
In a revealing part of the book, President Eisenhower wonders why the United States cannot “get some of the people in these downtrodden countries to like us instead of hating us.” The question, unfortunately for America, has yet to be answered correctly. Unlike President Truman, Eisenhower simply didn’t understand the complexity of Iranian nationalization. The very same can be said of the Shah, the Dulles brothers, and future Iranian and American leaders. Stephen Kinzer in comparison has by far the broadest comprehension of Middle Eastern politics, and realizes it encompasses religion and culture impervious to unwanted intervention. Of course, he has the benefit of looking at everything in hindsight but nevertheless it is clear that the CIA never studied Iranian history as thoroughly as Kinzer. If it had, perhaps a different conclusion would have been reached besides resorting to a coup. In regards to the core ideas of All the Shah’s Men, Kinzer effectively proves that although political and social change in Iran is necessary, it simply cannot be achieved through hasty foreign intervention. He makes clear that after perceived success in Iran, America continued to intervene in other countries. Also, Kinzer manages to prove that the coup had some dire consequences that definitely led towards future hostilities towards the United States. However, the coup is not the place of origin for Middle Eastern Terror, but rather Middle Eastern resentment of the West. How this resentment was chosen to be expressed was irrelevant to the coup, and absolutely in the hands of the Iranian people.
All the Shah’s Men serves as an entertaining, informative, and controversial read. Stephen Kinzer is a journalist by trade, and does some quality research in his examination of the 1953 coup. In the epilogue, he chronicles his visit to Iran and subsequent search for any visible traces of Mossadegh’s legacy. Outside of his home village, there is hardly a legacy at all. Since the beginnings of the Iranian Revolution, Mohammad Mossadegh and the humanity, honesty, and fairness associated with him have been far removed from the political scene in Iran. Hopefully history will not repeat itself, and the international community will recognize the long term dangers of short term fixes. Kinzer admirably dedicates this book to the people of Iran, but it is even perhaps more useful for those outside of Iran. Once the CIA-backed coup and its unfavourable aftermath are studied, the modern political and cultural tension between the Middle East and the United States is provided with some history. In hindsight, it is incredible to consider the amount of effort that was put into planning and executing the coup in comparison with effort put towards negotiating a deal over Anglo-Iranian Oil. Had all parties involved, especially the British, focused on finding a way to continue working cooperatively with Iran, the future of the Middle East may be very different. May luck be a lady in the future of Iran and its neighbours, or the Middle East may continue to luck out in its long search for democracy.
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